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This paper provides the various estimates of Russia’s unofficial economy during the 
transition period and discusses the estimation methods of the unofficial economy. It 
suggests that Russia’s unofficial economy, which substantially increased during the 
early 1990s and stands still high compared to other countries, is caused by the 
institutional and cultural legacy from the Soviet era and problems in the transition 
period such as poor quality of institutions and newly available opportunities. It 
emphasizes the importance of understanding the evolution of the unofficial economy 
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  1I.  Introduction 
 
The transition toward a market economy in a number of Eastern European countries 
and former Soviet republics has been accompanied by a sharp increase in unofficial 
economic activities. This phenomenon has startled many observers and policy makers. 
A market mechanism replacing centralized planning was believed to increase the 
transparency and efficiency of the economic system and thus reduce incentives to work 
unofficially. Hence, such an unexpected increase in the unofficial economy was viewed 
as, at the least, a symptom of partial failure during economic transition and a cause of 
serious concern for the future of transition countries.               
The Russian unofficial economy has attracted much attention from researchers. 
Majority of empirical studies on Russia’s unofficial economy relied on cross-country 
analysis. Some of these studies estimated the size of the unofficial economy in various 
countries, including Russia, and others identified the determinants and likely effects on 
the economy. At the same time, some works focused on the Russian unofficial economy 
itself, and discussed why economic agents participated in the unofficial economy, what 
activities were conducted, and how they changed over time.  
Most studies found that the Russian unofficial economy is comparatively large. 
Weak property rights and poor quality of public services during the transition period 
were often suggested as the main reasons for such a large unofficial economy. In 
addition, the transition generated new opportunities for firms and households to enrich 
themselves even by engaging in unofficial economic activities. Poor households might 
have used the unofficial economy as a survival mechanism. However, the Russian 
unofficial economy is not a new phenomenon, nor did it emerge solely from the 
transition process. The second economy in the Soviet Union was widely known to 
coexist and interact with the official socialist economy, causing the path dependency of 
Russia’s unofficial economy during the transition period.  
One of the most important obstacles of research on the unofficial economy is the 
lack of relevant data. In this sense, the availability of aggregate and microeconomic 
information on the Russian unofficial economy presents an excellent opportunity to 
obtain more reliable estimates on both its determinants and impacts on the economy. 
Moreover, the dynamics and heterogeneity of unofficial economic activities, which tend 
to be overlooked in existing literature, can be explored using a proper dataset.   
“Unofficial economy” is not a firmly established term. Other terms are also used to 
refer to the economy, significantly overlapping with or similar to the unofficial one. 
Such terms include informal, non-observed, non-recorded, hidden, shadow, and 
underground economy. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD, 2002) uses the term “non-observed economy,” which includes underground, 
illegal, informal, household production for self-consumption, and other productive 
activities missing from the basic data of the system of national accounts (SNA).
1 The 
OECD defines the non-observed economy in the context of the SNA. Thus, activities 
engaged in the non-observed economy should be productive. In other words, the non-
                                                 
1 According to the OECD (2002), underground economy refers to one producing legal goods and services, 
but is concealed to evade taxes or avoid regulations. Illegal economy produces goods and services that are 
illegal or provided by unauthorized producers. Informal economy, which is more prevalent in developing 
countries than in developed ones, is one conducted mostly by households at low levels of organization.    
  2observed economy should involve value-adding activities, not value-redistributing 
activities, such as bribes.
2  
In the present work, the unofficial economy is defined as the production of goods 
and services that should be included in the GDP, but are either excluded from the 
official estimates of the GDP because of lack of information or included only by 
estimating the production of such goods and services indirectly.
3 Using this definition, 
we exclude the activities of illegal organizations, such as the mafia, from the analysis of 
the present study because these cannot be registered in most countries and thus escape 
detection in the official estimates of the GDP. The covered unofficial economic 
activities are those conducted by enterprises and households. Thus, the definition of 
unofficial economy is narrower than that of the non-observed economy used by the 
OECD.     
The present work is laid out as follows. Section II discusses the Soviet second 
economy, highlighting the historical and cultural roots of the Russian unofficial 
economy. In Section III, various existing estimates of Russia’s unofficial economy are 
presented and discussed. Sections IV and V examine the causes and effects of the 
Russian unofficial economy, respectively. Section VI presents the conclusions. 
 
   
II.   The Soviet Second Economy 
 
A large unofficial economy existed during the Soviet era (Grossman, 1977, 1979, 
1987; Ofer and Vinokur, 1992; Treml and Alexeev, 1994; Kim, 2003).
4 According to 
Grossman (1977), the so-called second economy is defined as all production and 
exchange activities with at least one of two features: direct pursuit of one’s private gain, 
or significant violation of the laws and regulations in the socialist economy. In addition, 
O’Hearn (1980) notes a third feature: the second economy operates outside of central 
planning. For example, cultivating on private plots can satisfy the first and third features 
and thus can be recognized as second economy activity. Speculation (i.e., the resale of 
goods and services at prices higher than the purchase price) satisfies all three features. 
Using  tolkach (expeditor) or markets to procure inputs in order to achieve planned 
targets can also be classified as second economy activities. The latter may not have been 
intended directly for private gain; however, it violates laws and regulations, and 
operates outside central planning.  
According to the above definition, the second economy includes both value-
creating and value-redistributing activities. Speculation and purchasing inputs do not 
directly create value unless they are transferred to higher-value users; in contrast, 
private plot activities and shabashniki (private construction workers) do. Hence, the 
definition of the second economy during socialism is broader than the unofficial 
                                                 
2  Bribe can generate economic value if it increases the efficiency of government officials. Faster 
processing of paperwork and “getting things done” induced by bribe are some of these examples.   
3 Some countries, including Russia, estimate the unofficial production of goods and services indirectly 
and include the value of such goods and services in the official estimates of the GDP.
 The
 definition
 of the 
unofficial economy used in this paper distinguishes directly estimated official GDP from that estimated 
indirectly, and include the latter as part of unofficial GDP. 
     
4 Alexeev (1995) provides an excellent review of the unofficial economy in traditional Soviet Union and 
Perestroika. 
  3economy defined in the present study. It is also important to stress that the second 
economy was large in the USSR because many value-adding activities, such as almost 
any private production and sale outside of agriculture, were treated as illegal in the 
USSR.  
In the Soviet Union, second economy activities were rooted firmly in the workings 
of the centrally planned economy (CPE). The CPE consisted of complex balance 
mechanisms between demand and supply (e.g., material balancing deals with 30,000 
commodities and 70 volumes of compiled documents with 12,000 pages) (Gregory and 
Stuart, 1998). The sheer magnitude of the task often led to inconsistencies in the plans. 
For example, output targets were imposed even without the delivery of the necessary 
inputs. Managers were required to fulfill the output target while also needing inputs to 
be used for production. Thus, inputs were purchased from tolkachi or secondary markets. 
Such costs were financed by selling goods at prices higher than the official ones, or by 
illegally converting passive money to active one (Harrison and Kim, 2006). This 
planning system was the basis on which the second economy grew and intertwined with 
the first economy in a complex way (Davis, 1988).     
Chronic shortages were also an important cause of second economy activities. 
Rural and many urban households relied on cultivating private plots in response to 
chronic shortages of food. Some of them sold potatoes and vegetables produced from 
private plots at kolkhoz markets. Buying goods at lower official prices and selling them 
in secondary markets at higher prices was prohibited, but was nevertheless widespread. 
Several foreign goods with existing demand but not domestically produced, such as blue 
jeans, were smuggled into the Soviet Union and sold at secondary markets. Bribery 
became prevalent, partially due to shortages. Households and firms had incentives to 
pay bribes to officials and shop workers who were influential in deciding to whom the 
goods in short supply would be sold.     
The weak monitoring of state assets facilitated second economy activities. State 
ownership was viewed by the Soviets as “nobody’s ownership,” encouraging the theft 
of state assets. Truck drivers used fuel supplied for official jobs for their private 
businesses or errands. Construction material stolen from workplaces was used to build 
or repair houses or dacha. According to Treml (1990), the estimated value of theft of 
materials from workplaces was about 70.4 billion rubles in 1980, or between 3% and 
5% of the Soviet’s gross social product.
5 The prohibition of private activities also 
contributed to the second economy. For example, doctors treated paid patients after their 
working hours, and teachers privately taught pupils (Grossman, 1977).  
Local researchers have attempted to estimate the size of the Soviet second economy 
before its collapse. Estimates range from 50 to 300–350 billion rubles (Koriagina, 1990; 
Golovin and Shohkin, 1990, Goskomstat SSSR, 1990). However, these Soviet sources 
failed to provide a clear explanation on how such figures were derived.   
Other researchers outside Russia have attempted to estimate the size of the second 
economy. Grossmann (1979) estimated the size of several illegal private activities, 
whereas O’Hearn (1980) provided estimates of a few specific consumer goods and 
services that were unofficially traded. Using surveys of Soviet émigrés, Ofer and 
Vinokur (1992) and Grossman (1987) estimated that the share of private income in the 
                                                 
5  Gross social product consists of all goods created by all enterprises and production associations, 
including output of inputs, intermediate, and final goods.  
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1970s, respectively. However, these results should be considered as a first 
approximation because they were based on unrepresentative samples of Soviet émigrés 
living either in the United States or in Israel. Treml and Alexeev (1994) used Russian 
and Ukraine regional data to analyze the dynamics of the Soviet second economy. They 
estimated the relationship between the population’s official money incomes and various 
dependent variables such as bank savings and expenditures on certain consumer goods. 
In general, this relationship became weaker over time, indicating that the Soviet second 
economy substantially increased. Kim (2003) provided annual estimates of the second 
economy from 1969 to 1990 using the data from unpublished Soviet family budget 
surveys. The average share of Soviet households’ expenditure in secondary markets in 
the total expenditure was 23% from 1969 to 1990, amounting to about 6.8% of the 
official Soviet GNP. However, according to estimates, this share did not increase over 
time until the mid-1980s when it began to rise during the Perestroika period.    
 In summary, the Soviet second economy was undoubtedly large and prevalent in 
various sectors. A bulk of second economy activities was caused by problems arising 
from the central planning system itself. Soviet firms and households were familiar with 
such activities, through which they learned how to survive and possibly prosper in the 
presence of institutional rigidities and failures caused by the distorted system. This 
experience was transferred to new economic conditions, that is, a market economy.       
 
III.  Measuring the Unofficial Economy During Russia’s Transition 
 
A good number of studies attempted to estimate the magnitude of the Russian 
unofficial economy during the transition period and found that it has increased 
substantially during the early 1990s. Table 1 shows the various estimates of Russia’s 
unofficial economy. One of the most cited works is that of Kaufmann and Kaliberda 
(1996) who used the so-called total electricity consumption (TEC) method. This method 
is based on the assumption that the elasticity of electricity consumption with respect to 
the total (official and unofficial) GDP is close to 1. Thus, the difference between the 
growth rates of the official GDP and that of electricity consumption can be ascribed to 
the change in the unofficial GDP. For example, when electricity consumption rises by 
8% while the official GDP grows by only 3% in a certain year, the unofficial economy 
must have increased by 5%.
6 Clearly, in order to estimate the size of the unofficial 
economy in a given year, this method requires an estimate of the unofficial GDP in a 
reference year which should be inferred from other sources. Based on the assumption 
that Russia’s unofficial economy was at 12% of the total GDP in 1989, Kaufmann and 
Kaliberda estimated the unofficial economy at 32.8% in 1992 and 40.3% in 1994. 
Johnson et al. (1997) extended the estimate of the unofficial economy for 1995, which is 
41.6% of the total GDP. Their findings imply that Russia’s transitional recession had 
not been nearly as deep as suggested by the official GDP. While the Russian official 
GDP declined by 50.9% from 1989 to 1995, the total GDP including production in the 
unofficial economy decreased only by 26% over the same period.  
                                                 
6 Kaufman and Kaliberda (1996) applied a different elasticity of electricity consumption with respect to 
GDP, depending on current economic conditions such as rising or decreasing GDP.   
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intuitive, simple, and consistently applicable to a number of countries where data on 
electricity consumption and official GDP exist. Nevertheless, the approach has at least 
two serious problems. First, the assumption of near unit elasticity of the GDP with 
respect to electricity consumption is difficult to justify for countries experiencing deep 
structural transformations and rapid changes in energy prices (Schneider and Enste, 
2000; Acaravci and Ozturk, 2010). In particular, using the panel cointegration approach, 
Acaravci and Ozturk (2010) found that there is no long-run equilibrium relationship 
between electricity consumption per capita and GDP per capita for 15 transition 
countries including Russia. Second, the accuracy of the estimate of the unofficial 
economy relies critically on the initial size of the unofficial economy, which cannot be 
obtained from this method and must be taken from a different source. As a result, 
estimates could vary greatly depending on the initial estimate (Alexeev and Pyle, 2003; 
Kim, 2003). 
Lacko (2000), Eilat and Zinnes (2002), and Feige and Urban (2003, 2008) 
attempted to address the first criticism as above. Lacko (2000) argued that household 
electricity consumption (HEC) better captures the unofficial economy in transition 
countries because it is less likely to suffer from biases due to structural changes in the 
economy than one using TEC. However, her estimates of Russia’s unofficial economy 
are not so different from Johnson, Kaufmann, and Kaliberda’s, which are presented in 
the second column of Table 1. The following criticism can be made on HEC: using 
household electricity consumption excludes activities conducted by firms and 
organizations, which may account for a substantial part of the total unofficial economic 
activities in transition economies. This leads to inaccurate estimates, unless a high 
positive correlation exists between the unofficial economy in the non-household sector 
and that in the household sector.  
Both Eilat and Zinnes (2002) and Feige and Urban (2003, 2008) used the modified 
total electricity consumption (MTEC) method to estimate the unofficial economy in 
transition countries. They tried to eliminate part of the increase in the TEC estimates of 
the unofficial economy due to changes in energy prices, industrial structure, and the 
share of the private sector in the economy. As columns (3) and (4) of Table 1 show, 
their estimates are substantially lower than those using TEC or HEC. Eilat and Zinnes 
(2002) assessed that the Russian unofficial economy was about 34–35% of the total 
GDP from 1995 to 1997, whereas Feige and Urban (2003) estimated that the average of 
the unofficial economy for 1993–2000 was 31.6%.  
Alexeev and Pyle (2003), Kim (2003), and Kim and Kang (2009) looked at the 
effect of the initial estimate of the unofficial economy on subsequent estimates. While 
Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) and Johnson et al. (1997) assumed that the size of the 
unofficial economy in 1989 was the same at 12% of the total GDP across all Soviet 
republics, substantial heterogeneity was actually observed within the Soviet Union. For 
example, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan were known to have relatively large 
unofficial economies, whereas Russia had a considerably smaller informal sector 
compared to these countries.  
Inaccurate estimates of the pre-transition unofficial economy result in erroneous 
estimates during the transition period. Alexeev and Pyle (2003) used Treml’s (1992) 
estimate of the unofficial economy in 1979 based on time allocation survey (11.8% of 
all working time of Soviet households were spent on private economic activities in 
  61979) and applied the TEC method for 1980 and 1989. They obtained 22% as the 
estimate of the Soviet unofficial economy of the total GDP in 1989, and estimated 
Russia’s unofficial economy in the same year using the Berkeley-Duke survey of Soviet 
émigrés. As a result, Russia’s unofficial economy in 1989 was estimated to be 18% of 
the total GDP, which is higher than Kaufmann and Kaliberda’s.  
In contrast, Kim (2003) and Kim and Kang’s (2009) estimates of the unofficial 
economy as a share of the total GDP in 1989 and 1990, respectively, are substantially 
lower than Kaufmann and Kaliberda’s. Kim (2003) found that the official data on GDP 
during the socialist period included part of the value-added production of the unofficial 
economy. Using the data derived from the Soviet family budget surveys, he estimated 
that the production of the unofficial economy, not including the officially counted GDP, 
amounted only to 5% of Russia’s total GDP in 1989.
7 Kim and Kang (2009) used a time 
budget survey of Soviet households conducted in March 1990 to estimate the unofficial 
economy in the same year. Using the time spent on private plot activities in total 
available time as a proxy for the share of the unofficial economy in the total GDP, the 
Soviet unofficial economy was thought to account for 8.5% of the total Russian GDP in 
1990. The application of the above 1990 estimate to the discrepancy between the growth 
rate of electricity production and that of gross regional product suggests that the share of 
the unofficial economy in 1995 was 29%, rather than the 41.6% claimed by Johnson, 
Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997).
8 These studies illustrate how large differences in the 
estimates of the unofficial economy can arise for subsequent years due to disparity in 
the estimates in the reference year.
9  
The most recent estimates of Russia’s unofficial economy were provided by 
Schneider et al. (2010a) who used the multiple indicators and multiple causes (MIMIC) 
approach to estimate unofficial economies for 162 countries. The MIMIC approach is 
based on estimation of structural equations consisting of those for the various causes 
and effects of the unofficial economy. The size of the unofficial economy, which is an 
unobserved variable, is calculated following the estimation of the parameters of these 
equations. According to Schneider et al. (2010a), the average of the share of the 
unofficial economy as a percentage of the total GDP from 1999 to 2007 in Russia was 
43.8%. This suggests that the Russian unofficial economy as a share of the total GDP 
during 1999–2007 was still very high, and this somewhat increased from Johnson et 
al.’s (1997) estimate of 41.6% in 1995. However, the annual trend of the share of the 
unofficial economy has been decreasing from 47% in 1999 to 40.6% in 2007. Although 
this method improved estimations of the unofficial economy using a more 
comprehensive set of variables and an established statistical model, the reliability of the 
estimates can still be questioned. For example, the stability of the parameters estimated 
                                                 
7 According to Kim, the household production of Russia’s unofficial economy unaccounted by the official 
GDP was estimated to be 3.5% in 1989. He added additional 1.5% to account for enterprise production in 
the unofficial economy. This estimate of Russia’s unofficial economy in 1989 was substantially lower 
than those in other Soviet republics such as Georgia where the share of value-added by household 
production in the total GDP was 12.7% in the same year.    
8 They used the official GRP instead of the official GDP because, unlike the latter, the former excludes 
some part of the unofficial economy. Russia’s official GDP includes its estimate of the unofficial 
economy and a main adjustment to take the unofficial economy into account since the official GDP is 
made at federal level (Granberg et al., 1998). 
 
  7in the model cannot be guaranteed. Furthermore it still requires an initial a priori 
estimate of the unofficial economy as in TEC.     
Goskomstat began to disclose statistics on the unofficial economy from the late 
1990s, which are available from 1993. It explains that the unofficial economy was 
estimated using indirect information. These include the balancing method, method of 
commodity flows, special surveys, and expert estimates (Masakova, 2000; United 
Nations, 2000, 2004).
10 Goskomstat’s estimates of the unofficial economy grew rapidly 
from 1993 to 1997, at 13% and 23% of the total GDP, respectively. These figures are 
much lower than those estimated by Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) and Johnson et al. 
(1997). Furthermore, Khomenko (2007) claimed that the unofficial economy shrank 
substantially between 1997 and 2005. In detail, she presented Goskomstat’s estimate of 
the unofficial economy in 2005 as 18% of the total GDP. A similar estimate is found in 
Kim (2003) who used the income-based sectoral approach, which sums the income 
components such as wages, operating surplus, and taxes estimated from various surveys 
to provide an estimate of the unofficial economy. According to Kim, the share of 
Russia’s unofficial economy from 1997 to 1998 was approximately 27% of the total 
Russian GDP.     
Goskomstat statistics include hidden wages for the employed as part of the GDP 
produced in the unofficial economy since 1993. Table 2 presents the share of hidden 
wages as a percentage of the official GDP and total wages. It shows a notable trend: it 
stabilized from 1997 to 2004 at a range of 10.3–11.7% of the GDP following a rapid 
increase from 5.31% of the GDP in 1993 to 11.7% of the GDP in 1996; however, it 
tended to increase gradually from 2005 to 2010 and stood at 14.3% of the GDP in 2010. 
In terms of the share of hidden wages of the total wages, more than a quarter of wages 
paid to the employed was hidden in 2010. Kevesh, Deputy Chairman of Goskomstat in 
2004, provided some figures on the unofficial unemployment based on population 
census data. According to him, 10.6 million people or approximately 15% of the total 
employed personnel were involved in unofficial economic activities in 2003. 
Approximately 83% of the main work lies in the official sector, but the remaining 
personnel of 17% were employed in the unofficial sector, which provided an additional 
source of income (United Nations, 2004). 
A notable approach to understand the size of the unofficial economy was made by 
Braguinsky et al. (2010) who focused on a certain type of unofficial economic activities 
using micro-level data. They used a panel of individuals and households living in 
Moscow and matched car registries to employers’ records of paid earnings. Thy found 
that the size of hidden earnings is striking: hidden earnings accounted for more than 
75% of the total income for the period of five years from 1999 to 2003. The share of 
hidden earnings of the total income was highest among employees in the public 
secondary education, which amounted to 87%. The respective 55.5% and 62.7% of the 
                                                 
10  This suggests that Goskomstat’s estimates of official GDP includes value-added production in the 
unofficial economy (United Nations, 1995), thus the electricity method applied to Russia by Johnson, 
Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997) and others would lead to gross overestimation of the contribution of the 
unofficial economy to the total GDP if such an inclusion was made before 1996. However, it is not 
certain from when the unofficial economy was included as part of the official GDP. United Nations 
(2000) suggests that it began to be included from 1995, but hidden wages as part of the unofficial 
economy were estimated from 1993 and appeared to have been included from such year.   
  8total earnings of federal government employees and law enforcement officials were not 
reported as well. 
The estimates of the share of the Russian unofficial economy in the total GDP 
differ substantially depending on the methods employed. In particular, the estimates by 
TEC, MTEC, and MIMIC vary widely, particularly because of the differences in the 
estimate of the unofficial economy in a reference or an initial year. Nevertheless, most 
studies appear to agree on three issues. First, Russia’s unofficial economy is larger than 
the average of those of other transition countries. Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer 
(1997) stated that in 1995, among the 18 transition economies in former Soviet 
republics and Eastern Europe, Russia belonged to the top four countries in terms of the 
unofficial economy share in the total GDP, following Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine. 
Lacko (2000) ranked Russia as 8th out of the 20 transition countries in 1995, although 
her estimates of the unofficial economy of Russia were similar to that of Johnson, 
Kaufmann, and Shleifer. However, no country has a higher income per capita and a 
larger unofficial economy than Russia. According to Schneider et al. (2010a, 2010b), 
the size of Russia’s unofficial economy as a percentage of the total GDP was 34th out of 
the 158 countries in 2006 and 4th out of the 21 transition countries in the same year. 
Second, Russia’s unofficial economy rapidly increased during the first half of the 
1990s. All the available estimates, including the Russian official statistics, suggested 
that the Russian unofficial economy as a share of the total GDP dramatically increased 
during the early years of transition. Goskomstat estimated that its share nearly doubled 
during 1993–1997, whereas according to Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997), the 
share increased more than three times between 1990 and 1995.  
Third, although it is less obvious than the previous findings, available estimates 
suggest that the unofficial economy stabilized during the second half of the 1990s and 
decreased to some extent in the 2000s. According to Eilat and Zinnes (2002), Russia’s 
unofficial economy as a share of the total GDP has not increased from 1995 to 1997. 
Both estimates of Schneider (2010) and Goskomstat suggest that it even shrank during 
2000s.    
 
 
IV.  Causes of the Increases in the Unofficial Economy During 
Russia’s Transition 
 
The substantial increase in Russia’s unofficial economic activities during the early 
1990s, as suggested by Table 1, may be attributed to multiple causes. Social, political, 
and economic environments likely affected unofficial economic activities that emerged 
during the transition period. At the same time, factors inherited from the socialist period 
also played an important role.  
Some causes of the second economy activities disappeared during the transition 
period. Central planning was abolished with the introduction of market mechanism and 
private ownership. In addition, price liberalization eliminated chronic shortages. The 
pursuit of private interests was no longer prohibited, allowing economic agents to open 
businesses and to freely engage in private trading. That is, the legalization of most 
private economic activities during the transition period changed the nature of the 
unofficial economy substantially. Such changes meant not only challenges, but also new 
opportunities for economic prosperity.  
  9The transition toward a market economy has been turbulent in Russia. The rapid 
disintegration of the Soviet Union led to significant weakening of political control over 
the society. Subsequent political struggles between Eltsin and his opponents resulted in 
further destabilization. Institutional capacity to monitor, coordinate, and control the 
economy was substantially undermined. Economic agents were often prompted to 
pursue their own interests illegally in the belief that detection would not be easy. If 
detected, penalties could also be avoided with bribes. The fear factor of being detected 
and penalized, which limited illegal activities in the Soviet Union to some extent, 
significantly decreased. The liberalization of economic activities without sufficient 
institutional development to regulate economic agents led to rampant increases in 
private activities with illegal components. 
The path dependence of institutional problems suggests that the unofficial economy 
in transitional Russia is affected by similar factors which existed in the Soviet Union. 
Corrupt bureaucrats demand bribes in return for letting economic agents violate laws 
and regulations. Firms are less likely to pay taxes when they feel that the government 
fails to provide public services to protect their property rights. Businesses may also 
want to hide sales, make unlawful connections with bureaucrats, or even hire mafia to 
provide protection services. In summary, new opportunities, combined with decreased 
fear of the authorities and poor quality of institutions, are likely the causes of the rapid 
growth of the unofficial economy in the enterprise sector. In this environment, firms 
attempt to conceal sales and profit to avoid taxes, and employ unregistered workers to 
avoid social security payments (Schneider and Enste, 2000; Johnson, et al., 2000). 
Barter was partially used to avoid restructuring and hide the true amount of sales (Kim 
and Pirtilla, 2004).   
Conventional causes of the unofficial economy found in other countries must have 
contributed to the unofficial economy. Tax evasion has been regarded as the most 
common cause of unofficial activities by firms violating laws and regulations (Feige, 
1989; Thomas, 1992). There is some empirical evidence that tax evasion increases with 
tax rates (Schneider, 2000; Fisman and Wei, 2004). However, some studies suggested 
that marginal tax rates are negatively correlated with the unofficial economy (Johnson et 
al., 1997; Friedman et al., 2000). For example, using data from 69 countries, the study 
by Friedman et al. (2000) claimed that high tax rates may strengthen institutions and 
thus reduce unofficial economic activities.  
Studies on the causes of the unofficial economy concluded that excessive 
bureaucracy, corruption, and poor enforcement are the main contributors to the 
unofficial economy (Eilat and Zinnes, 2002; Johnson et al., 1997; Friedman et al., 2000). 
In this vein, Johnson et al. (1997) classified former Soviet republics and East European 
countries in three groups. The first group of countries has good-quality institutions, 
relatively fair taxes and regulations, and a more liberal economy. This group, to which 
most East European economies belong, tends to have smaller unofficial economies. The 
second group of countries consists of less-liberal countries, such as Uzbekistan and 
Belarus. These countries also have relatively small unofficial economies. Migration 
constraints and political repression reduce the unofficial economy in spite of distortive 
tax systems and poor provision of public goods. Large unofficial economies are 
observed in the third group of countries, where political liberalism is more advanced 
than in the second group. However, these countries suffer from weak institutions, 
massive tax distortions, and onerous regulations. Russia is said to belong to the third 
  10group at least until the mid-1990s, although its tax system has improved, especially after 
the 2002 tax reform.  
The estimates of Russia’s unofficial economy as a share of the total GDP presented 
in Table 1 show that it appeared to stabilize from the mid-1990s following a rampant 
increase from 1990 to 1995 and start shrinking after around 2000. This trend can be 
understood from the perspective of institutional and policy changes. The quality of 
institutions measured by governance indicators of the World Bank Institute suggested 
that it declined until 2000 before a significant increase in the early 2000s (Guriev and 
Zhuravskaya, 2010). A substantial increase in the unofficial economy from 1990 to 
1991 must have been associated with the substantial deterioration of the quality of the 
institutions, although the measures of institutional quality are not available for such 
years. A decrease in institutional quality continued even during the immediate years 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union; according to the simple average of three 
separate indices of political risk from the PRS group, that is, Corruption, Law and Order, 
and Political Stability, Russia’s institutional quality decreased from 3.47 to 3.30 from 
1992 to 1993.
11 Hence, a dramatic increase in the unofficial economy during the first 
half of the 1990s is likely to have been caused by such deterioration in the quality of 
institutions. Stabilization in the size of the unofficial economy during the second half of 
the 1990s might have been helped by improved political stability but still hindered by 
poorer quality of government services in terms of government effectiveness and 
regulatory quality (Guriev and Zhuravskaya, 2010). 
A shrinkage of the unofficial economy as a share of the total GDP from the early 
2000s might have been caused by two important factors. First, institutional quality has 
improved during the early 2000s measured by the aforementioned governance indicators. 
Second, the tax reform implemented in 2001 has a positive impact on tax compliance. 
The new tax law, which became effective from the beginning of 2001, changed not only 
tax rates but also the administration of taxes. A flat rate of 13% applied to personal 
income replaced a progressive taxation with marginal rates of 12%, 20%, and 30%. 
Furthermore, a new system of tax administration was introduced: a common taxpayer 
ID was introduced; tax authorities were allowed to assess tax liabilities; and tax audits 
became possible by the law when there was sufficient evidence on a tax evasion. 
Studies investigating the impact of these changes on tax evasion concluded that tax 
compliance accounted for most of the increase in tax revenue after this reform, whereas 
the introduction of flat tax rates itself had little or limited effects on tax revenue 
(Ivanova et al., 2005; Gaddy and Gale, 2005; Gorodnichenko et al., 2009). For instance, 
Gorodnichenko et al. (2009) used the gap between the reported income and 
consumption expenditure available from Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Surveys 
(RLMS), and compared the tax payment between the pre-reform and post-reform 
periods. They claimed that the introduction of flat income taxes failed to increase 
productivity but led to substantial rise in tax revenue through increases in tax 
compliance.   
Both firms and households can participate in the unofficial economy for similar 
reasons. However, some causes of such activities can differ between these two types of 
economic agents. Table 3 shows the types and causes of unofficial economic activities 
for different economic agents. In the enterprise sector, unofficial economic activities 
                                                 
11 An increase in this measure refers to an improvement in the quality of the relevant institutional element.  
  11can be conducted by both registered and unregistered firms. The types of unofficial 
activities by registered firms include hiding sales and profits or employing workers 
without registration. Firms that are not registered with relevant authorities evade tax 
payments and social security contributions. The main types of household unofficial 
activities include employment in the main and secondary workplaces, where income 
taxes and social security contributions levied on employees are not paid.
12  
Unincorporated and unregistered self-employment is part of household unofficial 
economy. Sales of agricultural products produced by cultivating private plots belong to 
the unofficial economy as long as households fail to abide by tax laws.             
Bribes paid to government officials are likely to be correlated with the hidden sales 
of firms (Levin and Saratov, 2011). Johnson et al. (2000) compared the extent of bribes 
in five transition countries: Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Slovakia, and Romania. The 
incidence of bribes was much higher in Russia and Ukraine than in the other three 
countries. For example, approximately 90% of Russian and Ukraine firms claimed that 
typical businesses in the same industry make extralegal payments for licenses and 
services.
13 In contrast, such figures dropped to 20–40% in the other countries.  
Households engage in unofficial economic activities for diverse and complex 
reasons. It is believed that the poor and the needy are more likely to participate in the 
unofficial economy for survival (Desai and Idson, 2000; Rose 1994). In particular, the 
severe recession experienced by the Russian economy in the first few years of the 
transition might have forced many households to find a way for survival. However, 
existing literature suggests that the relationship between low income as a proxy for 
household survival needs and involvement in the unofficial economy is not significant 
(Kolev, 1998; Kim, 2002).
14 Conversely, educated and skilled individuals are more 
likely to participate in moonlighting as a main domain of unofficial economic activities 
conducted by households (Guariglia and Kim, 2006).  
Transition has exposed households not only to opportunities but also to uncertainty. 
Faced with high uncertainty, households use the unofficial economy as insurance. For 
instance, having a secondary unofficial job, in addition to a main job, reduces the risk of 
financial instability, which may be caused by a loss of their main job (Skoufias, 2003). 
Guariglia and Kim (2006) focused on moonlighting to investigate whether it was used 
as a way to change jobs.
15 They found that Russian workers who desire a job change 
were more likely to hold a secondary job without quitting their main job.  
                                                 
12 A main job in Russia is the workplace where a person keeps his labor book. This traces the “official” 
work history and salaries. Benefits such as medical and pension rights are provided based on this job 
record.  
13   Using Ukrainian household data on wage gaps between the public and the private sectors, 
Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova (2007) estimated that bribe paid to government officials amounted to 
0.9–1.2% of Ukraine’s GDP and 3.8–4.8% of the official wage bill in 2003.    
14 Among transition countries, there are differences in the characteristics of participants in the unofficial 
economy. For example, unofficial economy participation in Romania is negatively correlated with income 
level, suggesting unofficial economy as a survival mechanism (Kim, 2005). In contrast, Rosser and 
Rosser (2000) found a negative correlation between income equality and the size of the unofficial 
economy in transition countries including Russia.   
15 According to Kim (2002), the share of the unofficial secondary job in total secondary jobs ranged from 
64% to 78% from July 1997 to January 1999. This suggests that secondary jobs in Russia are 
predominantly unofficial.  
  
  12Lumping these diverse unofficial economic activities together as one category and 
then ascribing the reasons for participation to a single cause (e.g., tax evasion) is grossly 
inadequate. The causes of unofficial economic activities differ substantially in terms of 
the types of economic agents and the activities they conduct. Given this heterogeneity, a 
better research strategy is to unbundle the unofficial economic activities. Each activity 
may then be analyzed in a more systematic way.       
The second economy in the Soviet Union has been transformed into an unofficial 
economy during the transition toward a market economy. Therefore, Russia’s unofficial 
economy has some characteristics unlike those during the socialism period. 
Nevertheless, the path dependence of Soviet firms and households familiar with second 
economy activities might have played an important role in increasing and shaping the 
unofficial economic activities during the transition. Old skills and networks acquired 
from their past were applied to new settings. Institutional legacy, corruption, bribery, 
and the culture of beating the system of excessive regulation in the Soviet period would 
continue to exist in the transition period. Firms and households also carry on exploiting 
opportunities that have opened and become more available during this period.  
    
V.  Effects of the Unofficial Economy During the Transition of 
Russia 
 
Controversies remain in areas as to how the unofficial economy affects the formal 
economy, and to what extent it is harmful or beneficial for the economy as a whole. 
Several studies suggest that the unofficial economy has various negative effects on the 
economy. The most obvious effect lies in the area of public finance. Participants in the 
unofficial economy fail to contribute to government revenue, which is the most 
important resource for the provision of public goods (Johnson et al., 1997). Institutional 
quality may deteriorate due to lack of financial resources. This may induce a vicious 
cycle in which less tax revenue causes the low quality of institutions, leading to more 
instances of tax evasion of economic players (Friedman et al., 2000). The tax burden of 
legitimate firms increases due to tax evasion of others. Consequently, some firms in the 
official sector may decide to evade taxes at least in part. Weak institutions might be 
more detrimental to private firms rather than state-owned enterprises that are more 
likely to have the existing network of firms, banks, and organizations supporting one 
another.  
The less obvious and contestable effects of the unofficial economy on the economy 
as a whole include those on growth and income inequality. One group of economists 
argued that unregistered firms are typically small and thus are likely to suffer from low 
productivity. Furthermore, unofficial activities may involve higher transaction costs 
(Tokman, 1978). It is also possible that the unofficial economy hurts the economy by 
eroding social norms and decreasing trust in institutions, and by interacting with 
corruption (Wallace and Latcheva, 2006; Friedmann, 2000; Dreher and Schneider, 
2010).
16 These suggest that an economy with a larger unofficial sector grows more 
slowly compared to one with a smaller unofficial sector (Loayza, et al, 2010). However, 
                                                 
16 However, corruption may not always be positively associated with the unofficial economy; it may be 
substituted or complemented depending on conditions. See Choi and Thum (2005) and Dreher and 
Schneider (2010) for more detailed discussions.    
  13counter-arguments are easily available. The unofficial economy emerges as a rational 
reaction to the poor quality of institutions and economic policies. Transaction costs in 
the official economy might be greater than in the unofficial one in the case where 
regulations are particularly excessive (Choi and Thum, 2005). As a result, unofficial 
activities, which can be viewed as those that help economic agents circumvent 
inefficiencies in the existing system, may benefit the economy as a whole. For example, 
a non-compliant activity in the presence of onerous regulations may facilitate efficiency 
in the economy (de Soto, 1989). However, despite the importance of the issue, the effect 
of the unofficial economy on growth still remains largely unexplored.    
Some studies based on cross-country datasets claimed that unofficial economic 
activities in transition economies including Russia increased income inequality (Rosser 
et al., 2000, 2003).
17 This finding suggests that those who are relatively rich than the 
poor in terms of official income are engaged in unofficial economic activities more 
actively. It is in line with the findings of those who used Russian household datasets 
(Kolev, 1998; Kim, 2002; Clarke, 2002). Nonetheless, the Romanian case was different. 
In Romania, the poor and the needy participate in unofficial economic activities more 
frequently and thus income inequality measured in terms of total income (official 
income plus unofficial income) was reduced because of such activities (Kim, 2005). 
These contrasting results indicate large heterogeneity in the nature of the unofficial 
economy even across transition countries.     
It is difficult to obtain reliable results on the relationship between the unofficial 
economy and other macroeconomic variables using cross-country data. One of the main 
reasons is that the characteristics of the unofficial economy are so diverse across 
countries and thus are difficult to control them fully. In addition, causality may run in 
both directions between the unofficial economy and other macroeconomic variables. 
Income distribution can be a cause of the unofficial economy as well as its effect. The 
same applies to the relationship between growth and the unofficial economy. Arguably, 
a better approach to understand the effects of the unofficial economy on economic 
performance is to use microeconomic data focusing on a certain country or a region 
instead of using cross-country data.  
Guariglia and Kim (2006) used household panel data, namely the RLMS, to 
investigate whether unofficial moonlighting jobs evolve into formal self-employment. 
Households were found to use moonlighting as a job-change mechanism. A desire to 
switch jobs expressed in the past is positively related to moonlighting in the present, and 
even to actual job changes in the future, particularly self-employment. The share of 
workers who moonlighted as self-employed in the past was found to represent 26.5% of 
the newly self-employed. Thus, moonlighting acted as an instrument that helped job 
changers to shift jobs into self-employment more smoothly with lower risk of being 
unemployed.  
The above findings are reinforced by Kim and Kang (2009) who examined the 
effect of the unofficial economy in the past on the growth of small enterprises in the 
present using the data on the Russian regions from 1992 to 1999. It was found that 
                                                 
17 Rosser et al. (2000) provided a simple correlation between the unofficial economy and the extent of 
income inequality in 16 transition countries including Russia; the correlation between the Gini coefficient 
and the unofficial economy share during 1993–1994 was found to be 0.76. Using multiple regressions of 
data from 18 transition economies, Rosser et al. (2003) found that income inequality is significantly 
correlated with the size of the unofficial economy. 
  14Russia’s unofficial economy was partially caused by a delay in reform and the low 
quality of institutions. Nevertheless, entrepreneurial activities in the face of government 
failure used the unofficial economy as an incubator. The unofficial economy becomes 
official over time, when structural reform quickens its pace and institutional quality 
improves.
18  
Some characteristics of the unofficial economy in transition countries might be 
different from those of other countries. This is because the path dependence is 
intertwined by new opportunities and challenges caused by the transition process. This 
suggests that countries may differ in terms of inherited history, culture, and economic 
and social environments regarding unofficial economic activities. Policies will be less 
effective or even harmful if such diversity of unofficial economic activities across 
countries is ignored. In addition, an understanding of the effects of the unofficial 
economy will be facilitated by looking at the dynamics of the unofficial economy, that 
is, whether unofficial economic activities evolve into official ones over time (Asea, 
1996; Levenson and Maloney, 1998). A static snapshot picture cannot possibly reveal 
such dynamism.      
 
VI.  Conclusions 
 
The Russian unofficial economy is large and has grown substantially during the 
early years of the transition period toward a market economy. According to various 
estimates, the share of the unofficial economy of the total GDP increased from 8–12% 
in 1989–1990 to 20–42% in the mid-1990s. Available estimates suggest that the 
unofficial economy stabilized during the second half of the 1990s and decreased to 
some extent in the 2000s. Some estimates suggest that Russia’s unofficial economy 
ranged between 34% and 35% from 1995 to 1997, and other estimates show that it 
decreased somewhat from the early 2000s.    
A substantial increase in the unofficial economy during the early 1990s was 
affected by several newly emerged factors during the transition. These include 
weakened control of the state on society, and opportunities to enrich themselves. In 
addition, the path dependence of the Russian culture and institutions inherited from the 
Soviet era is likely to have influenced the large unofficial economy. Soviet economic 
agents developed a series of unofficial ways to avoid excessive regulations, causing the 
prevalence of second economy activities. Some sources of the second economy, such as 
chronic shortages, disappeared when transition began. However, old habits and culture 
that regards violations of laws and regulations as, at most, necessary evils would 
continue to determine the behavior of a large number of individuals and firms in 
                                                 
18 La Porta and Shleifer (2008) presented three views on the relationships between official firms and 
unofficial businesses. The romantic view suggests that the unofficial sector, which emerges because of 
improper protection of property rights, is an engine of growth that can be formalized when institutional 
quality improves. The parasitic view regards the unofficial sector as a collection of small firms that exist 
to avoid taxes and regulations. Finally, the dual economy view indicates the lack of interaction between 
the official and the unofficial sectors because the latter is dominated by less-skilled and less-educated 
agents. Using firm-level data mostly from African and Asian countries, they found little evidence on this 
evolution of firm from being unofficial to formal. Kim and Kang (2009)’s finding contradicted that of La 
Porta and Shleifer (2008), indicating that the Russian unofficial economy has different characteristics 
from those in the developing countries of Africa and Asia.    
 
  15transitional Russia. Hence, the significant expansion of unofficial economic activities in 
Russia during the early 1990s can be viewed as the result of partially unsuccessful 
institutional transformation compounded by historical variables. An increased political 
stability might have helped the stabilization in the size of the unofficial economy during 
the second half of the 1990s, but poor institutional quality prevented the unofficial 
economy from decreasing. It appears that a decrease in the unofficial economy as a 
share of the total GDP from the early 2000s might have been caused by an improvement 
in institutional quality and tax reforms in 2001.  
 The effects of the unofficial economy on the economy as a whole are a complex 
issue. The unofficial economy decreases tax revenue. Its untaxed nature may undermine 
economic growth by leading the authorities to levy excessively high taxes on official 
businesses, and by constraining the development of institutions and social infrastructure. 
Furthermore, social capital based on mutual trust may be eroded. The possible 
complementarity between corruption and the unofficial economy means that Russia’s 
corruption, which is one of the most significant obstacles in its development, would be 
difficult to reduce unless the unofficial economy is dealt with. However, the dynamic 
nature of Russia’s unofficial economy must not be forgotten. Some evidence suggests 
that, in both the household and the business sectors, some parts of unofficial economic 
activities are temporary. Households use moonlighting to change jobs toward self-
employment and entrepreneurship. Hence, unofficial secondary employment can be 
viewed as a risk-reduction mechanism facilitating job changes. In addition, the positive 
correlation between previous unofficial sector and the number of current small firms 
suggests the evolution of unofficial firms toward official ones. That is, small firms that 
operated in the unofficial sector in the past became official due to progress in structural 
reforms and institutional development. 
There is substantial heterogeneity in the characteristics of the unofficial economy 
across countries. Income inequality worsens in some countries because the main 
participants in the unofficial economy are relatively rich compared to non-participants. 
In contrast, household unofficial economic activities are driven by survival motive in 
other countries, suggesting that they reduce income inequality. In addition, the reasons 
for household involvement in the unofficial economy are different from those for firms. 
Various types of unofficial economic activities by households and firms exist. 
Disregarding such heterogeneity in the unofficial economy would lead to grossly 
inadequate and hasty generalizations. Russia is an interesting case that shows the effects 
of path dependency, challenges, and opportunities on the unofficial economy, and 
illustrates the heterogeneity and dynamics of unofficial economic activities.   
 
  16Table 1: Various Estimates of Russia’s Unofficial Economy 
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 MIMIC  VA   ISA  
1989  12.0  12.0     18.0  5.0       
1990 14.7          `  9.0       
1991  23.5                
1992  32.8  38.0              
1993 36.7  36.0           13.0   
1994  40.3  39.0             
1995 41.6  39.0 34.6  45.6  17.0  29.0       
1996     35.1           27.0 
1997     34.2         23.0   
1998              22.0   
1999             47.0    






     46.1    
2001              45.3    
2002              44.5    
2003              43.6    
2004              43.0    
2005               42.4  18.0   
2006              41.7    
2007              40.6    
 
Notes 
TEC: Total electricity consumption 
HEC: Household electricity consumption 
Surveys: Various surveys of household economic activities 
MTEC: Modified total electricity consumption  
MIMIC: Multiple indicators multiple causes  
VA: Various methods 
ISA: Income-based sectoral approach 
 
Sources 
a: Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) 
b: Johnson, Kaufmann and Schleifer (1998)  
c: Lacko (2000)  
d: Eilat and Zinnes (2002)  
e: Feige and Urban (2008) 
f: Alexeev and Pyle (2003) 
g: Kim (2002) 
h: Kim and Kang (2009) 
i: Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro (2010a) 
j: Masakova (2000); United Nations (2000, 2004); Khomenko (2007) 
k: Kim (2003) 
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Table 2: Russia’s Official Estimates of the Share of Hidden Wages  
 
Year  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998  1999  2000  2001
Share of hidden wages of GDP  5.31 8.51 10.4 11.7 11.7 10.3 10.9  11.1  11.1
Share of hidden wages of total 
wages 
11.9 17.3 23.0 23.5 23.4 21.4 27.2 27.6 25.8
Year  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  2008  2009  2010
Share of hidden wages of GDP  11.5 11.3 11.7 11.8 12.8 13.4 12.6  14.9  14.3
Share of hidden wages of total 
wages 
24.7 24.0 25.4 26.9 28.8 28.7 26.6 28.3 28.4
 
Sources: Russian Statistical Yearbook (2001) (1993–1994); Russian Statistical 
Yearbook (2005) (1995–1999); Russian Statistical Yearbook (2010) 
(2000–2009); Russian Statistical Yearbook (2011) (2010)     
 
  18Table 3: Types and Causes of Unofficial Economic Activities in the Enterprises 
and the Household Sectors  
 
Agents Types  Causes 
Enterprises  
 
•  Hiding profits and sa
les 
•  Unregistered worker
s (avoiding payroll ta
xes) 
•  Unregistered firms  
•  Tax evasion  
•  Too heavy regulations 
•  Weak property rights 
•  Poor qualities of institution
s (e.g., corruption and unfai
r court system) 
Households  •  Self-employment acti
vities (unincorporate
d and unregistered) 
•  Private plot develop
ment 
•  Moonlighting (dual j
ob holding)  
•  Tax evasion  
•  Survival  
•  Exploiting opportunities 
•  Smoothing job transition  
•  Poor qualities of institutions 
(e.g., corruption and unfair 
court system) 
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